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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRAN!{ TAYLOR and MARGARET ~
GARNER, djbja FRANK TAYLOR
and GARNER,
Plaintiffs and Appellant,
-vs.LEE L. DAHL,
Defendant and Appellant,
and

Case
No. 9172

PETER W. HUMMEL,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs and by the Defendant Lee L. Dahl from a Summary Judgment entered
by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson on the 23rd day
of October, 1959, (R. 29).
This action was originally commenced by Frank
Taylor and Margaret S. Garner, doing business as Frank
Taylor and Garner, the Plaintiffs, against Lee L. Dahl
and Peter W. Hummel as Defendants on the 24th day of
February, 1959, (R. 1). Plaintiffs allege that they are
1
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duly licensed real estate brokers inthe State of Utah and
that the Plaintiffs obtained the earnest money agreement
whi~h is attached to Plaintiffs' Complaint a~d marked
Exhibit "A," (R. 4) signed by the parties and a deposit
:Of $10,000 ·on the purchase of the home of the Seller Lee
L. Dahl by the Purchaser, Peter W. Hummel. The Plaintiffs_ al~o obtained a sales agency agreement fron1 the
Defendant Lee L. Dahl wherein and whereby it was
agreed that a 5!fo commission was to be paid to the Plaintiffs for the sale of said home. After the execution of the
earnest-money receipt the-parties had a dispute and the
actual transfer of property was never consun1illated. The
Plaintiff.s did not claim the full $10,000 and in order to be
reliev·ed of any duplicate claims tendered into Court the
$10,000 less the real estate commission of $3,750.00, and
by Plaintiffs' Cmnplaint sought to have the Court adjudicate the rights of the parties in and to the $6,250.00
and·to award to the Plaintiffs the real estate commission
of $3,750.00 and reasonable attorney's fees in connection
with the action brought, (R. 1-4). The Defendant, Peter
W. Humlnel, in answering Plaintiffs' Complaint admitted
that the Plaintiffs were licensed brokers in the State of
Utah; that the Defendant Dahl was a resident of Salt
Lake County; that the Defendant Hummel was a nonresident, but the property which was made the subject of
the suit was within the jurisdiction of the Court, (R. 5).
The Defendant further admitted that he had deposited
the sum of $10,000 with the Plaintiff and that his signature
was genuine on the earnest money receipt, (R. 5). Defendant Hummel further alleges that he has made demand upon the Plaintiffs for the return of the full $10,000
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which the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Lee L. Dahl have
refused to return and admits that disputes have arisen
between the Defendant Hummel and the Defendant Lee L.
Dahl and generally denies Plaintiffs' Complaint except
for asking that the full $10,000 should be returned to this
Defendant, (R. 5-6). The Defendant Hummel then filed
a counterclaim in which he admits that he has deposited
with the Plaintiffs the sum of $10,000 and signed the
earnest money agreement which is heretofore referred
to and affirmatively alleges that that written instrument
was uncompleted in that the agreed plans and specifications detailing the finished worked to be completed had
not been procured, (R. 6). This Defendant further alleges that the deposit of the money was conditional upo:n
the Defendant Hummel being able to procure plans and
specifications for the work to be completed which were
to be subject to his approval and that no approval wa8
ever obtained from him, (R. 7). The Defendant further
alleges that there was misrepresentations on several occasions as to the square footage of the home and that upon
learning of the misrepresentations he refused to further
negotiate or further consumate the sale and that this
Defendant has demanded the return of the $10,000 to
himself, (R. 7).
The Defendant, Lee L. Dahl, in answering Plaintiffs'
Complaint admits that the Plaintiffs are licensed brokers and that the parties are residents of Salt Lake County, except for the Defendant Hummel, but that the property is within the jurisdiction of the court which is the
subject of this law suit, and further admits that a sales
agency agreement had been executed between the Plain-
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tiffs and this Defendant on the home which is the subject
of this law suit, and further admits that the Plaintiffs
obtained a purchaser for the property in the Defendant
I-Iummel and that the Defendant Hummel deposited the
$10,000 earnest money and that the earnest money agreement was executed by the parties, (R. 9). This Defendant,- Lee L. Dahl, denies that the Plaintiffs are entitled to
a real estate commission out of the fund and that the
Plaintiffs are entitled to any attorney's fees in connection with their action but that the money should all be
paid over to Lee L. Dahl, (R. 10). The Defendant, Lee
L. Dahl, then filed a counterclaim alleging that the earnest money agreement was entered into but that the Defendant Peter Hummel after the entering of the earnest
money agreement withdrew from his contractual obligation and refused to complete the agree1nent, (R. 10-11).
He further claims that the Plaintiffs had refused to turn
over to this Defendant the earnest n1oney in the amount
of $10,000 which was held in trust for the Defendant as
liquidated damages and that by reason of the fact that
the purchaser Peter Hummel had failed to complete the
transaction the Plaintiffs were not entitled to their real
estate conlillission or any of the money held by them and
that the money should be paid over to the Defendant
Dahl, (R. 11). The Defendant Dahl also asks for punitive dan1ages against the Plaintiffs for their failure to
turn over the money to him.
To these Counterclaims the Plaintiffs filed an Answer acknowledging the execution of the docu1nents but
denying that Plaintiffs were liable to the Defendants for
the return of the full $10,000.00 because of Plaintiff's
4
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real estate commission, (R.13-16). The Defendant Lee
Dahl filed a cross complaint against the Defendant Peter
Hummel, (R.17). In this cross .complaint the Defendant
Dahl alleges that Mr. Dahl and 1\ir. Hummel entered into
an earnest money agreement which was executed by the
parties and that the Defendant Hummel had deposited
as earnest money the sum of $10,000.00 to secure and
apply to the purchase price of the property located at
5834 Brentwood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, this being
the property in question in the law suit. It is further alleged that the Defendant Hummel had failed and
refused to complete the terms of the agreement and that
the Defendant Dahl should be entitled to the $10,000.00
as a liquidated damage and that further because the Defendant Hummel had requested certain changes be made
in the property which had been performed by the Defendant Dahl that the Defendant Hummel should be liable
to the Defendant Dahl for the sum of $3,000.00 for the
additional costs and expenses incurred and for attorney's fees as prayed.
The Defendant Hummel filed an answer to the cross
complaint in which he denies that there had been an
agreement entered into between the parties in that the
agreement was not complete and that there were misrepresentations as to the property, (R. 21-23). The Defendant Dahl filed a reply to the answer to the cross
complaint in which he alleges that there was no misrepresentation because the Defendant Hummel had personally inspected the property and that the agreement
was complete between the parties, (R. 24).
5
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On April 13th and 14th of 1959, depositions were
taken of the Plaintiff Margaret S. Garner and of each
pfthe Defendants Lee L. Dahl and Peter W. Hummel.
These· depositions. are part of the record of this case.
After the depositions were taken a pre-trial conference
was held before the ::Honorable l\1errill C. Faux and a
pre-trial order entered on September 11, 1959, (R. 26-28).
Each of the parties hereto then filed a separate motion
for Summary Judgment and the respective motions came
on for· hearing on the 15th day of October, 1959, before
the I-Ionorable Stewart M. Hanson. The Court, on the
23rd day of October, 1959, granted the Defendant Peter
W. I-Iumrnel's Motion for Summary Judgment against
the Defendant Lee Dahl and against the Plaintiffs, (R.
29-30)~

It is from this Motion for Summary Judgment that
the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Lee L. Dahl have appealed. The Motion for Summary Judgment was based
upon the pleadings and upon the depositions and exhibits submitted at the pre-trial conference. There were
no separate affidavits submitted with any of the motions
for summary judgment.
In order to give the court a better understanding
of the facts, the Appellants desire to give a brief suinmation of what was produced at the deposition as to the
actual background for this law suit. In order to simplify
this brief, the depositions will hereafter be referred to
by citing the depositions as follows: Margaret S. Garner
will be cited as "G" followed by the page reference,
Peter W. Hummel will be cited as "H" followed by the
6
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page reference and Lee L. Dahl will be cited as "D" followed by the page reference.
The Defendant I-Iu1nmel is a graduate geologist and
during all times material hereto was living out of the
state of Utah but had been interested in finding a home
to purchase here in Salt lake City. About the end of
October, or the first part of November, 1958, the Defendant Hurnmel contacted the Plaintiff Margaret Garner
for the purpose of having her, as a licensed real estate
agent, help him to find a home in Salt Lake City,
(H. 3). The Defendant Hummel described to Margaret
Garner the general size and type of a home in which
he would be interested, (H. 3). On five or six occasions
prior to December 16, 1958, Mr. Hummel and Mrs.
Garner went out to look at different homes, (H. 4).
The particular home under construction and which gives
rise to the basis of this law suit was located at 5834
Brentwood Drive in Salt Lake City. Mrs. Garner and
Mr. Hummel drove by the home and took a look at
it from the outside but because the doors were sealed
up with a plastic material they couldn't get in,
(H. 6). Subsequently, Mr. Hummel and Mrs. Garner
managed to go through the interior of this home and
made a complete inspection of it, (H. 6). At the time
of the inspection of this home by the Defendant Hum1nel
the exterior walls and interior walls were all constructed
and the roof was on but the home had not had its
interior decorating or interior fixtures installed, (H.
8). Defendant Hummel examined the property on several
occasions. Before the earnest money agreement was
entered into on December 16, 1958, Defendant Hummel
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went through the property with Defendant Dahl. This
home was being constructed by the Defendant Dahl for his
own personal use, (D. 2). When the DefendantHummel
expressed an interest in this property the Plaintiff
l\.fargaret Garner contacted the Defendant Dahl to see if
he was interested in selling it and finally obtained a
listing agreement from him on Dece1nber 10, 1958, (D.
19 and Exhibit D2 attached to deposition).
Mr. Hummell was acquainted with the fact that
this home was not one being constructed for sale but
constructed for Mr. Dahl as his own home and that jt
was through the efforts of Mrs. Garner that Mr. Dahl
would be willing to sell, (H. 9). l\1r. Hummel said that
he inquired about the square footage of the home and
was told that it was approximately 4,000 square feet
by Mr. Dahl and that l\!l:rs. Garner said that she thought
it was about 3,900 square feet, (H. 10). Mrs. Garner
was asked in her deposition as to whether or not Mr.
Hum1nel didn't ask Mr. Dahl the number of square
feet and she replied that she recalled it was 3,700 or
3,900 something under 4,000 square feet, she wasn't
certain, (G. 14). ~fr. Dahl said that he thought there
was approxi1nately 4,000 square feet in the house but
that he had never measured it, (D. 29-30). The Defendant Dahl had not made any blue print plans or specifications on the home before l\.fr. Hummel entered the
picture since he was the owner-builder, (D. 6). There
were, however, certain plans as to certain parts of it,
such as the kitchen, (H. 11, 19). l\Ir. Hummel and 1\lt:".
Dahl had on occasions discussed the finishing of the
house in respect to its decoration, utilities and fixtures.
8
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After seeing the house on several occasions Mr. Hummel
expressed the interest in it and on December 10, 1958,
:Mrs. Garner obtained the Sales Agency Contract from
Mr. Dahl, (Exhibit D2 attached to D's deposition). She
then contacted Mr. Hummel and said that she thought
they could possibly get the house for $75,000.00, (II.
18). Mr. Hummel said that this was the price that was
''suitable to me if we could get some indication as to
how the house was to be finished and put it down."
(;H. 18). A general discussion had been held between
Mr. Hunnnel and 1Ir. Dahl as to the completion but
l\Ir. Hummel stated that he would like some further
inforn1ation on it and would be willing to pay $75,000.00
for the house "if it could be completed in a manner to
me - quality wise, and so forth, in a manner of our
mutual agreement." (H. 18).
On December 16, 1958, a earnest money receipt and
offer to purchase was prepared by Mr. Wilford Kirton,
attorney for Mr. Hummel and signed by Mr. Hummel
as purchaser. Mr. Hummel was asked whether after
the document had been prepared if he read it over:

"A. Yes.
"Q. Both the type written portion and the
printed matter?
"A.

The fine print, yes." (H. 22)

l\1rs. Garner then took the earnest money receipt
to l\1:r. Dahl for his signature and on the same date,
December 16, 1958, obtained the signature of Mr. Dahl
on the agreement, (G. 19). However, an addition was
placed on the earnest money receipt and offer to pur9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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chase in pen changing the completion date from January
15, 1959 to February 1st or sooner. (See Exhibit D3
attached to D's d€position, also H. 32). At the time
of obtaining the signature of Mr. Dahl on the agreement Mrs. Garner also obtained the specifications as
to how the home was to be completed by Mr. Dahl,
(G. 19). These specifications were obtained in duplicate. on·· the same evening, Mrs. Garner then took
one set of the specifications to Mr. Hummel late that
same evening, (G. 29). At the time of delivering to
·Mr. Hummel a copy of the specifications, Mrs. Garner
said, ''Mr. Hummel, you have bought a house," (G.
29). Mr. ·Hummel then signed the receipt on the bottom
portion . of the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase, acknowledging a complete copy of the agreement, (G. 20 and H. 33). During the periods of these
negotiations and the signing of the agreement, Mrs.
Hummel had not been present. Mr. Hummel indicated
that he would like to bring his wife into the state to
see the house. Subsequently J\1rs. Hummel came into the
State of Utah to go over the house. J\1r. Hunm1el also
contacted Mrs. Garner about procuring a landscaper
to do development work on the outside of the house,
(II. 33-34). Mr. Hummel brought an interior decorator
with him when he subsequently came back to Utah
in the forepart of January, 1959, (H. 41). He claims
that at the time of the bringing in of the decorator
and. on this occasion in January he measured the square
footage of the house and found it to be approximately
3,400 square feet, (H. 41). At the time of the execution
of the Earnest Money and receipt nothing was said

10
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by Mr. Hummel nor any of the other parties about
the square footage in the house, (If. 22). Between the
16th day of December and the lOth day of January,
:Mr. Hummel had in his possession a copy of the. specifications furnished by Mr. Dahl, through Mrs.. Garner
and during this time he never contacted Mr. Dahl about
any changes in the home, (H. 45). Mr. Hummel said
that he had, however, discussed in several phone conversations with Mrs. Garner the possibility that he
would like to make some changes in the finishing work
of the home. After the Earnest Money Agreement was
executed by the parties hereto and the specifications
delivered to Mr. Hummel he thereafter never ·asked
Mrs. Garner whether or not there were any further
specifications or plans, (G. 45). On the contrary he
came again to Salt Lake with an interior decorator to
help plan the final designing of the inside of the
house. Mr. Dahl says that when Mr. and Mrs. Hummel
came back to see the house in January, 1960, they went
through the house and indicated the changes they wanted
made, (D. 31).
~Irs.

Garner states that the specifications to be
attached to the earnest money receipt were those specifications showing exactly how ~ir. Dahl had intended
to complete the home for his own use, giving the details
of what was to be done in the final decorating of the
home as he had originally planned it, (G. 47). She
further testified that it was also understood between
the parties that if Mr. Hummel desired to make any
changes or alterations in the specifications as originally
contemplated by Mr. Dahl that Mr. Hummel would be

11
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given credit if the change was for less money than
what Mr. Dahl had planned or he would pay the additional cost if the change exceeded the cost contemplated
by Mr: Dahl, (G. 47).
Mr. Hummel states this understanding as follows:

"Q. I am interested, Mr. Hummel, in getting, insofar as possible, the substance of the
conversation between you and l\frs. Garner before
you went to Mr. Kirton's office. Now, first of
all, did you discuss the purchase price as to
what you would pay or what Mr. Dahl may be
willing to sell this property for~

"A. Yes, I think she did. I think she said
- I was under the impression that she had
talked to Mr. Dahl on the telephone and that
through these discussions on the telephone with
him she had felt that she could probably get
the house for $75,000 and she told me this, and
I said that this sort of a price was suitable to
me if we could get some indication as to how
the house was to be finished and put it down.
She set the seventy-five thousand figure and I
concurred.
"Q. Had Mr. Dahl told you, prior to the
tirne that :Mrs. Garner stated that she thought it
could be obtained for $75,000, how he had intended to complete the house in respect to the
finishing matters, as to decorating, putting in
of the utilities and the fixtures, as it is socalled ~
"A. He had spoken of it smne in very general tenns, yes." (H.18)
The pre-trial order entered by Judge Faux on the
11th day of September, 1959, (R. 26-28) was prepared
12
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by counsel and subn1itted to the court for his signature.
This final draft was prepared by the attorney for Mr.
Hummel and recites in it the position of Mr. Hummel
as follows:
"In his Answer, Defendant Hummel alleges
that certain misrepresentations were .made to
him regarding the square footage of said home
by the Defendant Dahl; that said misrepresentations were made for the purpose of deceiving
said Defendant, and did deceive him; that he
relied upon the same and by reason thereof,
was induced to enter into the contract, and there;.
by seeks recision of the same and return of the
deposit made. Defendant Hummel likewise alleges that the contract for the purchase of said
home was not completed and that the execution
of the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase was conditional upon approval by said
Humrnel of certain specifications which were
never approved by him so that no contract for
the purchase of said home was in fact made."
(R. 27) (Emphasis added).
At the pre-trial the Court framed certain issues to
be resolved at trial. The first four issues to be resolved
by the Trial Court were as follows:
"1. As an issue of law, may the Defendant
liummel obtain recision on the ground of misrepresentations being made in connection with
the square footage of said home.
"2. In the event said Defendant may raise
such issue, an issue of fact will be whether
such misrepresentations were made as to justify
recision of the contract.
"3. Another issue of law is and will be
whether the Defendant Hummel may introduce

13
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oral testimony relative to the execution of said
contract to the effect that said contract was
,· signed conditionally and was not intended to be
accepted as the completed contract between the
parties.
"4. In the event that it is determined that
Defendant llummel may introduce oral testimony, an issue of fact will be whether or not
the contract marked Exhibit "D3" is a binding
contract between the parties." (R. 27) ·
As hereinbefore stated the Motions for Summary
Judgment were then filed and the matter heard before
the Honorable Stewart M. IIanson on the 15th day of
October, 1959, and a Summary Judgment entered in
favor of Defendant Peter Hummel and against the
Defendant Dahl and the Plaintiff herein on the 23rd
day of October, 1959. It is from this Summary Judgment that Plaintiffs and Defendants Dahl have appealed.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
In connection with this appeal, Plaintiff contends:
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT PETER W. HUMMEL
WAS ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT :
A. AS A MAT'TER OF LAW, THERE WAS A BINDING .CONTRACT UPON THE PARTIES IN THE FORM OF
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND AGREEMENT.
B. THERE IS A BONA FIDE ISSUE OF FACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THERE
WAS. A . MISREPRESENTATION IN CONNECTION WITH
THE AGREEMENT.
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C. IN ANY EVENT WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS
A BINDING CONTRACT BE'TWEEN THE PARTIES WAS
A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO. THE
TRIER OF THE FACT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT PETER W. HUMMEL
WAS ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
A. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THERE WAS A BINDING ·CONTRACT UPON THE PARTIES IN THE FORM OF
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND AGREEMENT.

Because of the complexity of the issues and the
numerous pleadings filed in this matter, the Court at
pre-trial and after a discussion with the parties, asked
the attorneys to prepare a pre-trial order in connection
with this case. A draft of the pre-trial order was prepared by the Plaintiffs' attorney and submitted to the
Defendants' attorneys. The changes were then made in
this draft and the final pre-trial order prepared by
Mr. Kirton, the attorney for the Defendant Hummel.
It is significant to note that the allegations claimed by
the Defendant Hummel were restricted to two in particular: First, that there had been a misrepresentation
(as to this point the Appellant will discuss the same
hereafter in the brief); and second, the pre-trial order
states "Defendant Hummel likewise alleges that the
contract for the purchase of said home was not completed and that the execution of the Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase was conditional upon
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approval by Mr. Hummel of certain specifications
which were never approved by him so that no contract
for the purchase of said home was in fact made." (R.
27) (Emphasis added).

The Court in the pre-trial order then framed the
issues to be resolved by the trial court. In Issue No. 3
the Court stated the issue as follows: "Another issue
of law is and will be whether the Defendant Hummel
may introduce oral testimony relative to the execution
of said contract to the effect that said contract was
signed conditionally and was not intended to be accepted as the completed contract by the parties." (R.
27). I-Iaving stated this as an issue of law, the Court
then framed Issue No. 4 to be resolved by the trial
court as follows: "In the event that it is determined
that the Defendant Hummel may introduce oral testiInony, an issue of fact will be whether or not the contract
marked Exhibit "D3" is a binding contract between
the Parties." (R. 27).
Thus clearly in view of the pre-trial order two
issues in connection with whether or not the contract
was a completed contract were fixed by the pre-trial
order. First, an issue of law and assuming that a court
should rule as a matter of law that the contract was
conditional and that oral testimony could be introduced regarding its conditional effect then the court
still kept as an issue, an issue of fact to be determined
between the parties.
Insofar as the issues are concerned between the
parties in this case, the pre-trial order governs. See
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Rule 16 U.R.C.P. wherein it is stated 1n referring to
the pre-trial order :
"The court shall make an order which recites
the action taken at the conference, the amendment allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issu.es for
trial to those not disposed of by admissions or
agreements of counsel; .and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the act~on,
unless modified at the trial to prevent manifesting justice." (Emphasis added)
It is clear, therefore, that upon a Motion for Summary Judgment the Court could not resolve all of the
issues because one of the issues was an issue of fact
reserved and had to be determined even in spite of
the fact that the court may have determined that the
contract was signed conditionally and could allow oral
testimony to that effect.
There has never been any argument nor is there
any issue between the parties that the Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase was executed by the
parties on December 16, 1958. The sole issue between
these parties as to this agreement ~s whether or not
the agreement was conditional in that the specifications
had to be approved by Mr. Hummel. No real issue is
made of the fact that there were never any plans attached because the home was 80 percent complete and
the plans with design of location of rooms and so forth
would all be superfluous, (D. 9 & 10). It was the specifications on how 1\tfr. Dahl proposed to complete the
house which gave Mr. Hummel the most concern. This
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is bourne out by· the pre-trial order since the only
question raised was whether or not :Mr. Hummel had
to approve the specifications, (R. 27). The portion of
the earnest money receipt which was prepared by Mr.
Hummel's attorney and typed in re.ads as follows:
'' S~ller · agrees to furnish said home and premises in
accordance with attached plan and spec., at his expense
on or before the 15th day of January, 1959." (Exhibit
D3 attached to D's deposition). Nothing is said in the
earnest money receipt about the specifications being
subject to the approval of JYir. Hummel.- This is attempted to be proven by the Defendant Hummel by
means of.· an oral modification of the written agreement
and in direct violations of the terms of the agreement
signed .by all of the parties. The agreement clearly
states that there are no verbal statements relative
to the tr~nsaction in the following words: "It is understood and agreed that the terms written in this receipt
constitute the entire Preliminary Contract between the
purchaser and the seller, and that no verbal statement
made by anyone relative to this transaction shall be
construed to be a part of this transaction unless incorporated in writing herein." (En1phasis added) (Lines
33 and 34 of Exhibit "D3" attached to Dahl's deposition).
It is adrnitted by all parties concerned that the
specifications were prepared and submitted to Mr.
IIummel at the time that he acknowledged a receipt of
the final copy of the agreement bearing all the signatures of the parties on December 16, 1958, (G. 29; H. 33).
In his deposition Mr. Hu1nn1el '\Vas asked and testified
as follows about the fine print in the agreement:
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.

"Q. After he had prepared the document to
which we refer, Exhibit D-3, did you read it over~
"A. Yes.
"Q. Both the typewritten portion and the
printed matter~
·
"A. The fine print, yes .." (Emphasis
(H. 22)

add~d)

Nowhere in the agreement is there any · statn1ent
whatsoever that the agreement was conditional upon
Mr. Hummel making a separate approval of the specifications. He in fact approved them when he took the
specifications and signed the receipt on the agreement.
He has never at any time claimed that the specifications
were hot as represented by Mr. Dahl in their prior
conversation, (D. 50).
The understanding of l\1r. IIummel as to the nature
of the plans and specifications to be submitted is
clearly shown in his deposition beginning with Page 18:

"Q. I am interested, Mr. Hummel; in getting, insofar as possible, the substance of the
conversation between you and Mrs. Garner before you went to Mr. Kirton's office. Now, first
of all, did you discuss the purchase price as to
what you would pay or what Mr. Dahl may be
willing to sell this property for~
"A. Yes, I think she did. I think she said I was under the impression that she had talked
to Mr. Dahl on the telephone and that· through
these discussions· on the telephone with him she
had felt that she could probably get the house
for $75,000 and she told me this, and. I "said that
this sort of a price was suitable .to me if we
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could get some indication as to how the house
was to be finished and put it down. She set
the seventy-five thousand figure and I concurred.
"Q. Had Mr. Dahl told you, prior to the
time that Mrs. Garner stated that she thought
it could be obtained for $75,000, how he had intended to complete the house in respect to the
finishing matters, as to decorating, putting in
of the utilities and fixtures, as it is so-called¥
"A. He had spoken of it some in very general terms, yes.

"Q. And in the light of what Mr. Dahl had
told you and your own physical observation of
the property, did you believe that you would
be willing to pay $75,000 for the property¥
"A. Well, I didn't believe that I would be
willing to pay $75,000 for the property as it
stood. I felt that I would be willing to pay $75,000
for the property if it could be completed in a
manner to my- quality wise, and so forth, in a
manner of our mutual agreement.

"Q. When you speak of your mutual agreement, had you told Mr. Dahl on the morning or
on the day that you inspected the property with
him how you wanted the house to be completed¥
"A. No.
"Q. So that the only information you had
as to how the property was to be completed was
what he had told you as to how he intended to
complete it~
'A. Generally speaking, that is correct. But
he hadn't told me in very specific terms. He just
said generally that this type of fixture goes in
the kitchen and this type of fixture goes some
place else, and in completing a home there is
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very much more detail. work involved than just
general-

"Q. In respect to the kitchen itself, had he
not shown you the plans and drawings of the
completion of the kitchen in accordance with
the subcontractor that was going to install the
cabinets'
"A. Yes, he showed me some of the plans
there, yes.
"Q. And you were aware that there were
no plot plans or profile drawings of the structure
of the house itself, were you not 7

"A. Yes.
"Q. And as far as that type of plan was
concerned, there was no purpose after you saw
the house to have any plan as to what was going
to be done insofar as the base of the house or
exterior walls or the roof because that had already been completed, isn't that right~

"A. Yes, that's correct." (H. 18 to 20)
It was never considered nor contemplated by the
parties that any blueprints should be drawn to show
the finished work in the house. The Court can take
judicial notice as a matter of common policy that these
are details which are included in the specifications as
to the type of finish there is to be put into the home.
As indicated by Mr. Hummel in his deposition the home
so far as the structure and the walls and the interior
walls were concerned was all fixed. It was only a rnatter
of where and how the fixtures were to be placed in
the rooms and what kind of paint, etc., was to be put
in. At this point it was not contemplated nor under-
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'stood that Mr. Rummel w~s paying $75,000 for the home
to be completed in the manner in which he desired
beca:use he was buying a home which was being built
by Mr.· Dahl .for himself and it was the intent of the
-parties that Mr. Dahl would sell the home fo:r the price
of $75,000 with the finish as he had originally. planned.
::Mr.. Dahl and Mr. Hummel went thr.ough the home and
outlined the details of what the plans were of Mr. Dahl
in finishing the home.
It was the understanding- and intention of the parties here that Mr. Hummel, if he desired to make any
changes in the finishing work that was planned by
Mr. Dahl, would either receive credit if the change was
for a lesser amount than what Mr. Dahl had contemplated· or would have to pay for an additional sum if
the change was in excess of what Mr. Dahl had contemplated.

Mr~

Mrs. Garner testified in response to questions by
Nielsen as follows :

"Q. And isn't it also a fact that Mr. Hummel verbally told Mr. Dahl that if, after receiving
the details of how Mr. Dahl _was going to complete it for himself, that Mrs. Humn1el wanted
to make any changes that Mr. Hummel ·would
then pay any extra that would be required~
"A. That is it exactly, and that is why no
one was concerned with this.
·

"Q. In other words, Exhibit D-4 was to
assure Mr. Hummel that if· his wife had no objection to the way Mr. Dahl had it planned that
22
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Mr. Dahl would ·complete it according to
said specifications f

tho~~

"A. Right.

"Q. But that if Mrs. Hummel did have any
difference of opinion as to color and materials
that she wanted in the finishing of the house,
then they would pay ~xtra or get a credit if
~hey eliminated them f
"A. Right, and that was discussed many
times.

"Q. So that the $75,000 which Mr. Hummel
was to pay was to buy the house as it was, as
he saw it, with the house to be finished as Mr.
Dahl said he would finish itf
"A. That's the truth.

"Q. And if there were to be any changes
made in it, just changes in any type of construction, he would be given a credit or a charge
depending upon whether the changes necessitated
additional work or eliminated work~
"A. Right. And he said that, I think, in
front of you.
"Q. So that when you gave Mr. Hummel
the specifications marked Exhibit D-4 that, so
far as you were concerned, completed the transaction and compiled with the part of the earnest
money receipt that said that the specifications
would be attached~
"A. Definitely.
"Q. And was it after that, after you had
given him the specifications, that Mr. Hummel
then reconfirmed the contract by signing it~
"A. Yes, after he had these in his hands
then he signed the receipt and signed the initialed the completion date.

23
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Q. So that he not only reconfirmed the
contract by signing the receipt for it, but he
also confirmed an extension of time in which
to complete it~
"A.

That's right.

"Q. Did he thereafter at any time ever claim
in your presence that the specifications which
you had given him on the night of the 16th were
not the specifications which he had requested or
which Mr. Kirton had indicated he should get
in connection with signing the earnest money
receipt~

"A.

Never." (G. 47 and 48)

The Defendant Hummel has never at any time asked
for any further plans or blueprints in connection with
home nor for any other specifications, (G. 38).
After Mr. Hummel signed the agreement on December 16, 1958, he returned to Salt Lake City in
January, 1959, and at no time had he ever objected
that the specifications were not as agreed, (D. 50 and
G. 45). After the date of December 16th, Mr. Hummel
even called Mrs. Garner and asked her to have a landscape gardner and interior decorator for the home, (G.
45). Mr. Hummel and his wife and their interior decorator went through the house in January, 1959 and told
Mr. Dahl of the changes they wanted made. They marked
up the finished walls, had cabinets removed, and had
the outside of the house repainted from green to white
in color. (D. 51 and 31). None of these ite1ns would
indicate that they were to "approve" the specifications
or that the agreement was "conditional." The .conduct
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of Mr. and Mrs. Hummel would indicate that they
recognized the agreement as binding. Mr. Dahl testified
in his deposition that Mr. Hummel called him and said
that the "deal is off" "because you misrepresented
the square footage." (D. 31) Nothing was said about
approving or not approving the specifications. Their
actions evidenced a contrary position to the one now
taken by their attorney.
Surely the position of the ·Defendant Hummel has
been and still is that he was to approve any specifications submitted and because of his failure to approve
them there was no contract. The trial court in granting
the motion for summary judgment has erred as a matter of law in holding that the agreement was subject
to approval because the agreement does not at any
place or any place in it say that the plans and specification were to be subject to the approval of the Defendant Hummel. On the contrary the agreement reads:
"Seller agrees to finish said home and premises with
attached plan and spec., at his expense on or before
the 15th day of January, 1959." The Defendant Hummel
has acknowledged a receipt of the agreement at the
time that he received the specifications from Mrs.
Garner. (Exhibit D3 attached to Dahl's deposition).
In this case it is ad1nitted that the "attached plan
and spec.," were not "attached" as such to the earnest
money receipt and offer to purchase, but the Defendant
Peter Hummel was delivered the specifications and
has not complained of the fact that they were not
attached but his position has been and is that he was
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to approve the specifications as received. Again referring to the pre-trial order as prepared by Defendant
Hummel's attorney, the order provides:
"Defendant Hummel likewise alleges that
the contract for the purchase of said home was
not completed and that the execution of the
earnest money receipt and offer to purchase was
conditional upon approval by said Hummel of
certain specificat~ons which were never approved
by him so that no contract for the purchase of
said home was in fact made." (R. 27) (Emphasis
added).
There is no place in the Earnest Money Receipt
and Offer to Purchase wherein the approval was required by Mr~ Hummel of the specifications. Since this
receipt and form was prepared by Mr. Hummel's attorney at the instance and request of Mr. Hummel it
would seem that if this was one of the conditions
necessary for the contract that such a clause would
have been placed in there by parties. Furthermore in
quoting from the forn1 on Line 33 to35 the form reads
as follows:
"It is understood and agreed that the terms
written in this reecipt constitute and entire preliminary contract between the purchaser and the
seller, and that no verbal statements made by
anyone relative to this transaction shall be construed to be a part of this transaction unless
incorporated in writing herein."
Mr. Hummel said at the time of the executing of
this agreement that he read it carefully, including the
fine pn1nt, (H. 22). What the Defendant Hummel is
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seeking to do here is to claim that there is no contract
between the parties because there was no approval of
specifications and this is in direct violation of the parol
evidence rule. The contract itself is clear and unambiguous.
Briefly stated the parol evidence rule restricts the
use of oral testimony which would tend to vary, or
contradict the terms of an unambiguous written instrument.
By clear and unambiguous terms the contract in
question (Exhibit D-3) recites that the building is to
be completed in accordance with attached plans and
specifications. Nothing in the writing gives any indication that the parties contemplated that the plans and
specifications were to be approved before the contract
became effective. Had this been the case it would have
been very easy to insert an approval clause. However,
this was not done and it should be noted that Defendant
Hummel placed his signature on the agreement at two
different times. First as the offeror and the second
time acknowledging receipt of a final copy of the
agreement.
This Court has frequently dealt with the Parol
Evidence Rule. In a recent Federal case handed down
by the Tenth Circuit (Nephi Processing Plant v. Talbot,
247 Fed. 2d 771) a problem very similar to the one
now before the Court was ruled upon and the Utah
law was examined by the Court. Briefly the facts were
these: An agreement had been entered into between a
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processing plant and an individual whereby the processing plant was to process the individual's turkeys.
A provision in the contract provided that the individual
should transport his turkeys to the plant, however, the
individual contended that upon discussing this provision
in the contract with the representative of the processor, the individual was told that the processing plant
paid all but a very nominal portion of the transportation costs. The trial court allowed this parol evidence
,concerning the agreement as to transportation costs
to come in. However, on appeal the Circuit Court reveresed the lower court and at page 775 of 247 Fed.
2d summarized the Utah law as follows:
"The Talbots testified that prior to signing
this agreement, Nephi had advised them that it
would transport the turkeys without any charge
except the Colorado ten mile tax. 'They said that
they understood the language in the agreement
to mean that they were to deliver the turkeys
to Nephi's trucks, which in turn would deliver
them to the processing plant. This testimony
is inconsistent with the provisions of a written
agreement between the parties. By unambiguous
terms in the processing contract, the Talbots
agreed to deliver the turkeys to the processor
at Nephi, Utah. The terms of such a contract
cannot be altered, varied or contradicted by parol
evidence."
The court cited the following Utah cases on the
point:

Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 105 Utah 272, 143
P.2d 281, 151 A.L.R. 275; Garrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah
184, 72 P.2d 449, 129 A.L.R. 666; Halloran-Judge Trust
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Co. v. Health, 70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342, 64 A.L.R. 368;
Ill oyle v. Congreg,ational Soc. of S.L.C., 16 Utah 169,
50 P. 806; Degnan, Parol Evidence, The Utah Vers~on,
5 Utah Law Review, No. 2, 158.
Professor Ronan E. Degnan, in his article uParol
Evvdence - Utah Version," 5 Utah Law Review, No.
2, Page 162 summarizes the reasoning behind the Parol
Evidence Law. His summary is squarely applicable in
this instance since the Defendant Hummel acknowledges
receiving a copy of the final agreement. Quoting from
Page 162 of Vol. 5 of the Utah Law Review, Professor
Degnan states the reasoning as follows:
. "This final agreement is the agreement of
the parties; it is the jural act to which the law
attributes changes in legal relationships. In short,
the later agreement supersedes all former. Thus
former negotiations or even agreements are excluded from a trial not because evidence as to
their existence would be untrustworthy but because they are legally im1naterial; if their existtence were proved or even admitted it would not
affect the rules of law to be applied in determining the disposition of the case."
So the Defendant in this instance should be held
to his bargain and should not be permitted to establish
by parol terms which are not expressed in the agremnent.
The Earnest Money Agreement and specifications
which were delivered to Mr. Hummel at the time that
he initialed the change in the agreement fixing the
completion date as February 1 "or sooner" and signed
at the bottom acknowledging ''receipt of a final copy
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of the foregoing agreement bearing all signatures" are
attached to the depositions as exhibits~
B. THERE IS A BONA FIDE ISSUE OF FACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THERE
WAS A MISREPRESENTATION IN CONNECTION WITH
THE AGREEMENT.

In the pre-trial order as signed by Judge Faux, the
issues to be resolved at trial were enumerated with the
first and second issues being as follows:
"1. As an issue of law, may the Defendant Hummel
obtain recision on the ground of misrepresentations
being made in connection with the square footage of said
home.
"2. In the event said Defendants may raise such
issue, an issue of fact will be whether such misrepresentations were made as to justify recision of the contract." (R. 27)
Again we call the Court's attention to the fact that
a Summary Judgment may be granted when there is no
dispute of facts and that the matter is clear to the
court that the judgment should be granted in accordance
with the relief prayed for. In this case the court has
set up a definite issue of fact as to whether or not there
were any such rnisrepresentations as would justify the
recision of the contract. If there is any reasonable conflict in the evidence the motion for Summary Judgment must be reversed on these grounds. Certainly
this is an issue of fact to be submitted to the trier of the
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facts and not to be resolved by summary judgment. Mr.
Dahl testified that when Mr. Hummel returned to Utah
in January of 1960 after examining the home and having
several conferences he called Mr. Dahl and said: "The
deal is off." Mr. Dahl wanted to know why the deal was
off. Mr. Hummel replied: "Because you misrepresented
,·

the square footage." (D. 31)
Mr. Hummel testified that he was concerned about
the square footage of the home and in his deposition he
testified as follows :
"Well, I had been quite concerned, as I was
in most of the homes that I went into, about the
size of the house, so before talking to Mr. Dahl,
but while still looking at the house with Mrs.
Garner, I asked her, did she have any sort of an
idea of the size of the house from the standpoint
of square footage, and at that time she said she
was not certain but that she thought it would be
around 3,900 square feet. And then when we saw
Mr. Dahl that first day, besides looking at the walking through and looking at the various rooms,
I asked him how big the house was, what was the
square footage, and he said approximately 4,000,
and then I asked him various questions which I
cannot recall at this time about certain things as
we walked through the house and how he intended
to finish this and finish one and another and nothe told me various things but, being completely
unfamiliar with decorating a home or furnishing
a home, I had no real idea what the real significance of these things might be. I admit to being
an amateur and so I felt that when the time came,
why, I would hire some sort of a consultant to
advise me." (H. 10).

31
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mr. Hummel further recalled a conversation with
Mrs. Garner after talking to Mr. Dahl in which he and
Mrs. Garner joked about the fact that Mr. Dahl was not
certain about the number of square feet in the building.
l\1r. Hummel referred to this conversation by saying:
" . . . This discussion that you are talking
about with Mrs. Garner, I think I remember saying that, 'I don't think he knows what he has got
in the house from the standpoint of what his expenses are and the rest of it. The fact that he
said "approximately 4,000 square feet" makes it
quite evident that he didn't know exactly how
many square feet there are.'" (H.13).
Mr. Dahl testified that he had never measured the
square footage of the home and that he told Mr. Hummel
that he did not know how many square feet there were
in the home but he said it could be around 4,000 square
feet, (D. 29). Mr. Dahl further said that because he had
never measured, he assumed there could be anywhere
from 3,500 to 4,500 square feet because this was something that he was not concerned with since he had built
the home with the design and size in mind as to meet his
needs and not with the over all size, (D. 30).
Mrs. Garner testified that she was present during
the conversation between 1Ir. Hummel and Mr. Dahl
and to the best of her recollection ~Ir. Dahl said it was
somewhere between 3,700 and 3,900 square feet or something under 4,000. She didn't ren1e1nber for sure. She
said that she wasn't paying too n1uch attention to the size
being quoted, (G.l4). And 1\frs. Garner further testified
that when Mr. Hu1nmel first inquired about the size of
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the home she said that she had a tape measure and told
him he could measure it if he wanted to but nothing was
done about this, (G. 16). This obviously makes a conflict
in the testimony and the facts to be determined by the
trier of the fact and not on the Motion for Summary
Judgment as to what representations were made and
what reliance was made upon these representations.
A very excellent annotation entitled, "Tort liability
for damages for misrepresentations as to the area of real
property sold or exchanged" is contained in 54 A.L.R. 2d
beginning at Page 660. In this annotation two statements
of significance are quoted. The first is found on Page
681 wherein the annotator says:
"The vendor of real property is liable in tort,
where, with intent to deceive his purchaser, he or
his agent misrepresented the quantity of the land,
and the purchaser relied upon such representations in mak~ng the purchase." (Emphasis added)
See also Page 682 wherein the annotator says:

"Where a vendee of real property justifiably
relies upon the misrepresentations of the vendor
or his agent as to the area of the land, recovery
may be had in tort if such representations are
found to have been fraudulent." (Emphasis added)
In our case Mr. Hum1nel did not rely upon the representations made by Mr. Dahl and in fact made the statement to :Mrs. Garner that he knew Mr. Dahl did not know
how many square feet there were in the house, (H.13).
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The recent Utah case of. Pace v. Parrish, (1952),
122 Utah 141, 247 P. 2d 273 cites the rules of law for this
state by saying that the burden is upon a person claiming
the fraudulent charges to prove them by clear and co11.vincing evidence and further that the elements of the
fraud are:
"These are: (1) That a representation was
made; ( 2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b)
made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing .the other
party, to act upon it; ( 6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7)
did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. See
Stuck v. Delta Land & Water Co., 63 Utah 495,
227 P. 791; Jones v. Pingree, 73 Utah 190, 273 P.
303; 23 Am. Jur. 773; 37 C.J.S., Fraud, Sec. 3,
p. 215."
In the Parrish case one of the things complained of
was a representation by the seller that the quality of the
certain land was just as good in one place as another
area and that the land could be cultivated, wherein and
whereas in fact there were large boulders on the land and
anyone by looking at the land could see that there were
rocks the size of a man's head. The court stated:
"Parrish did nothing to actively prevent the
Paces from n1aking an inspection of it and it
would have been little trouble to do so. Under
those circumstances, we believe that it must be
said as a matter of law that the plaintiffs did not
use reasonable care and diligence. They were,
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therefore, not entitled to rely on the representation and that item of $1,750.00 in the judgment
cannot be sustained."
In the Parrish case again, there was involved a portion of land which had been apparently referred to as
being owned and which in fact wa~ not owned by the
seller yet the appearance of the land was such that it
was impossible to tell that it was different from any
other land in the area. The court found that it would have
been expensive and involved for the purchasers to have
made a survey and examination of the title to ascertain
the ownership of this 11% acres and this court held that
they were not obligated to do so under the circumstances
and said "Their duty to use reasonable care would not
require them to go to such lengths." Such is not the case
in the matter of Mr. Hu1nmel because Mrs. Garner offered to measure the building with him if he wanted and
it was easily excessable and he could have Inade such
measurements as he desired.
This is not a case where the person who claims he
was defrauded was prevented from examining the property. Furthermore, ~fr. Hummel admits that he knew
that 1'Ir. Dahl did not know how many square feet there
were in the building and therefore did not rely upon any
statement of Mr. Dahl's.
C. IN ANY EVENT 'WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS
A BINDING CONTRACT BE'TWEEN THE PARTIES WAS
A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE
TRIER OF THE FACT.

In the pre-trial order the Court clearly sets out two
issues of fact to be submitted:
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"1. . . .
"2. In the event said Defendant may raise
such issue, an issue of fact will be whether such
misrepresentations were made as to justify recision of the contract.

"3. . ..
"4. In the event that it is determined that
Defendant Hummel may introduce oral testimony,
an issue of fact will be whether or not the contract
marked Exhibit 'D 3' is a binding contract between
the parties.'' (R. 27)
In this brief we have heretofore clearly pointed out
that a definite conflict appears in the testimony between
the parties. Certainly Mr. Dahl and Mrs. Garner claim
that whether or not there was any misrepresentation of
any facts as to square footage is a question of fact to
be submitted and even assuming for the purpose of this
argument that there may have been a misrepresentation,
it is a question of fact as to whether or not Mr. Hummel
relied upon it. This is particularly true in view of J\1:r.
Hummel's statement that he didn't think Mr. Dahl knew
how many square feet there were in the house, (R.13).
Certainly, if J\ir. Hu1nn1el is permitted to vary thP,
terms of the written contract (Exhibit D3) attached to
D's deposition), then it is a question of fact to be submitted to the trier of the fact as to whether or not the
specifications were to be "approved" by J\![r. Hummel before the contract became binding.
The evidence must be clear and unequivocal in order
to support a Summary Judgn1ent; see You.ng v. Felornia
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(1952) 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862 (Cert. denied 344 U.S.
885); Ulib.arri v. Christenson, 2 Utah 367,275 P. 2d 170;
Fountain v. Filson (1949) 336 U.S. 681, 61 S. Ct. 754, 93
L. Ed. 971; Holbrook et ux v. Webster's Inc., et al.,
(1958) 7 Utah 2d 148, 320 P 2d 661.
The rule of law as to review of a summary judgment is clearly stated in Federal Practice and Procedure,
by Barren and Holtzoff, Vol. 3, P. 120, as follows:
"On appeal from a summary judgment, the
Court appeals should view the facts from a standpoint most favorable to the appellant and accept
his allegations of fact as true, and assume a state
of facts most favorable to him. On appeal from a
summary judgment, the only question is whether
the allegations of the party against whom it was
rendered were sufficient to raise a material or
genuine issue of fact."
Courts should only grant Summary Judgment where
the facts are clear and unequivocal. U.R.C.P. 56 (c) provides in part as follows:
". . . The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law....."
Professor Moore in his treatise on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure has this comment on this particular
rule:
"The function of the summary judgment is to
avoid a useless trial ; and a trial is not only not
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useless (sic) but absolutely neces~arywhere there
is a genuine issue as to any material fact. In rul,.
:vng on a motion for S'ummary judgment the
court's function is to determine whether such o
genuine iss1w exists, not to resolve atny factual
issues." (Moore's- Federal Practice, Vol. 6, · p.
2101) (Emphasis added)
"The courts are in entire agreement that the
moving party for summary judgment has the
burden of showing the absence of any genuine
issue as to all the material facts, which, under
applicable principles of substantive law, entitle
him to judgment as a matter of law. The courts
hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy
his burden the movant must make a showing that
is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes
any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine
issue of material fact. Since it is not the function
of the trial court to adjudicate genuine factual
issues at the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment, in ruling on the motion all inferences
of fact from the proofs proffered at the hearing
must be drawn ag.ainst the movant and in favor of
the party opposing the motion. And the papers
supporting movant's position are closely scrutinized, while the opposing papers are indulgently
·treated, in determining whether the movant has
satisfied his burden.
"·To satisfy the moving party's burden the
evidentiary material before the court, if taken
as true, n1ust establish the absence of any genuine
issue of material fact, and it must appear that
there is no real question as to the credibility of the
evidentiary 1naterial, so that it is to be taken as
true. If the non-existence of any genuine issue of
material fact is established by such credible evidence that on the facts and the law the movant is
entitled to judgn1ent as a 1natter of law, the mo38
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tion ·should be granted, unless the opposing party
shows good reason why he is at the time of the
hearing unable to present facts in opposition to
the motion. If, however, the papers before the
court disclose a real issue of credibility or, apart
from credibility, fail to establish clearly that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the
motion must be denied." (Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 6, pp. 2133, 2126).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion the Appellants respectfully request the
Court to reverse the decision of the Honorable Stewart
Hanson in awarding a Summary Judgment for the reasons and upon the grounds that there is no clear issue
of law and fact which would allow the Defendant Peter
Hummel to rescind the contract and be restored to the
money that was deposited on the contract. The contract
is clear and unequivocal and since the Defendant Hummel
cannot alter or in any way change the terms thereof
and furthermore because there was no misrepresentation
or if any misrepresentation is claimed, it is a question of
fact to be decided by the trier of the fact and not by
summary judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN and
DEAN E. CONDER
OF NIELSEN and CONDER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Appellant
WALTER R. ELLETT
Attorney for Defendant Dahl
and Appellant
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